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Abstract
The lower bandwidth of mobile devices has until recently filtered the range of attacks on the Internet. However,
recent research shows that DOS and DDOS attacks, worms and viruses, and a whole range of social engineering
attacks are impacting on broadband smartphone users. In our research we have developed a metric-based system to
detect the traditional slow attacks that can be effective using limited resources, and then employed combinations of
Internet trace back techniques to identify sources of attacks. Our research question asked: What defence
mechanisms are effective? We critically evaluate the available literature to appraise the current state of the
problem area and then propose an innovative solution for the detection and investigation of attacks.
Keywords: Slow Attacks, Detection, Trace back, Mobile, Communications

INTRODUCTION
There have been known security incidents of DDoS involving Mobile devices. For instance, September 2015,
researchers from CloudFlare reported that a DDoS attack peaked at over 275,000 HTTP requests per second and
resulted in 4.5 billion hits on the targeted website. This was blamed on a malicious advertising that compromised up
to 650,000 Smartphones (Murdock, 2015, p.1). An update (2016) notes that these attacks spike during the weekend,
they are very large in size, and that these attacks are no longer targeted only at high profile websites but also at
mobile services. 3G technologies use IP technologies for control and transport; and, require cross network service
collaborations, multi-vendor, and a multi-domain environment in order to gratify a wide variety of needs. This
relationship requires Internet-based data and data from the cellular network in order to provide services to wireless
users (Kotapati, et al., 2005, p.631). Bailey et al. (2009) reported that smart devices were responsible for generating
14 times more traffic than a non-smart device. As a result, the cellular networks have made tremendous
improvements in order to meet the demands for increased bandwidth and communication requirements (Anstee et
al., 2013). According to Farina et al. (2014), the 4G connections are responsible for generating six times more
traffic than non 4G connections. However, globally, mobile data traffic reached 3.7 Exabyte per month in 2015;
making mobile data traffic grow 4,000-fold over the past 10 years and almost 400-million-fold over the past 15
years. Smart devices represented 36 percent of mobile device connections globally in 2015. This accounted for 89
percent of mobile data traffic in which 55 percent was mobile video traffic. Consequently our paper acknowledges
the trends but addresses the traditional slow attack that works with all mobile devices of any bandwidth (Farina et
al., 2016).
The new venture between the two different technologies introduces new vulnerabilities and exposes the users on the
cellular network to a range of additional risks across the new surface (Ricciato, et al., 2010, p.553).The introduction
and growth of usages of technologies such as 4G/LTE and its high bandwidth has increased the pervasive nature of
access points to the network. It is therefore evident mobile devices constitute not only a new target of an attack but
also it has the capability to execute an attack (Farina, et al., 2016, p.269). Contact lists stored on mobile devices can
be used to spread malware and infect other devices (Plohmann, et al., 2011, p.133). A DoS/DDoS attack has
evolved from flooding strategies to low bandwidth tactics that employ slow techniques and can operate in all
bandwidths. The purpose of this Slow DoS techniques is to lower the amount of bandwidth and resources that are
required to execute an attack. The slow techniques have been adopted and used against devices such as mobile
phones and game stations (Cambiaso, et al., 2012, p.195). While most of the packets sent to the target node in a
flooding DoS attack may be useless but, in a low-rate attack, almost all of the packets play a role in the success of
the attack. Therefore, the low-rate DoS will force the victim to process only the attack packets. There is not yet an
effective tool to address an efficient detection method in relation to slow-rate DoS (p.197).
In this paper, we present an innovative technique to detect this kind of attack on mobile devices and also the use of
multiple digital forensics methods to trace back the attack to its origin through the internet. The paper is designed to
define slow attacks and to demonstrate our detection metric. We then present a flow diagram for investigation of
slow attacks. The discussion on trace back reviews some of the previous and current literature in the field and draws
the conclusion that two techniques working together are better than one on its own. We conclude by discussing
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these claims and suggesting that slow attacks can be detected and managed to prevent loss of service to mobile
phone users.

LOW RESOURCE ATTACKS
Low resource attacks rely on drip feeding malicious packets into a system. These techniques are often described as
being slow because they are in contrast to flooding which rushes multiple packets through high bandwidth
connections (Gilad and Herzberg, 2012). In contrast a low resource attack slowly drips malicious packets into a
system such as a mobile phone where the victim processes every packet. Figure 1 shows the protocols which are
open for exploitation by low resource slow attacks. The key element in each protocol is the ability for the attacker to
slow down the attack packet by packet and to exploit the protocol mechanisms. Slow HTTP attacks, for example,
rely on the fact that the HTTP protocol, by design, requires requests to be completely received by the server before
they are processed. If an http request is not complete, or if the transfer rate is very low, the server keeps its resources
busy waiting for the rest of the data. If the server keeps too many resources busy, this creates a denial of service.
Table 1. Protocols for slow attack.
Protocols
Attributes

HTTP, HTTPS, ICMP, TCP, UDP,
SYN, IRC
Time interval

These types of attack are easy to execute because a single machine is able to establish thousands of connections to a
server and generate thousands of unfinished HTTP requests in a very short period of time using minimal bandwidth.
Due to implementation differences among various HTTP servers, two main attack vectors exist (Cambiaso, et al.,
2012):
 Slowloris: Slowing down HTTP headers, making the server wait for the final CRLF, which indicates the
end of the headers section; and,
 Slow POST: Slowing down the HTTP message body, making the server wait until all content arrives
according to the Content-Length header; or until the final CRLF arrives, where if HTTP 1.1 is being used
and no Content-Length was declared.
These attacks can just look like requests that are taking a long time, so it’s hard to detect and prevent them by using
traditional anti-DoS tools. In low resource conditions these attacks are effective because it does not require a large
number of packets to create the effect. A defence against such an attack can be made by the following actions:
 Reject / drop connections with HTTP methods not supported by the URL.
 Limit the header and message body to a minimal reasonable length. Set tighter URL-specific limits as
appropriate for every resource that accepts a message body.
 Set an absolute connection timeout nearing in mind that if the timeout is too short, you risk dropping
legitimate slow connections; and if it’s too long, you don’t get any protection from attacks. A timeout
value slightly greater than median lifetime of connections should satisfy most of the legitimate clients.
 The backlog of pending connections allows the server to hold connections it’s not ready to accept, and this
allows it to withstand a larger slow HTTP attack, as well as gives legitimate users a chance to be served
under high load. However, a large backlog also prolongs the attack, since it backlogs all connection
requests regardless of whether they’re legitimate. If the server supports a backlog, make it reasonably large
so your HTTP server can handle a small attack.
 Define the minimum incoming data rate, and drop connections that are slower than that rate. Care must be
taken not to set the minimum too low, or you risk dropping legitimate connections.
However, these actions provide some protection but they do not signal a slow attack is taking place – which we
address by innovation in the next section.

DETECTING ATTACKS
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is simple but a very powerful technique of attack that disrupts service (Hadiks
et al., 2014). The recent rapid proliferation and development of mobile technologies has also led to the exploitation
for service disruption (Stafford and Urbaczewski, 2004, p.292). New techniques have also been developed to exploit
the capacities and the characteristics of the service. This is where the DoS attack known as Low-rate DoS/DDoS
attacks has evolved (Wang et al., 2007). Low-rate DDoS sends attack traffic periodically to the target device which
makes it hard to detect amongst the normal traffic (Cambiaso et al., 2012). Various techniques for detection of the
traditional flooding DDoS has been discussed in the literature. This section is designed to define and propose the
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use of the distance based similarity metric to detect a Low-rate DDoS attack. The metric has been used in other
contexts by Riccardio et al. (2010) who proposed a Similarity of Attack Intentions (SAI) to estimate the similarity
of cybercrime intentions for network forensics. Another study found that using self-similarity algorithm to detect
flooding DDoS attacks (Yu, 2014b). It has been used as the method for link predictions that compare one data set
with another. For instance, x and y is assigned a score Sxy which can be defined as proximity or similarity between x
and y (Yu, 2014a). The Similarity metric can be used in a more skilled approach such as using node attributes to
define their similarity (Yu, 2014c). Similarity has been used also to evaluate distances between nodes. The shorter
the path between nodes, the more similar they are (Snoeren et al., 2012). Distance based similarity metric is
employed in this study to evaluate the similarity of the previous log file against the current log file in order to
determine if a DDoS attack has occurred. Hadicks et al. (2014) argued that defining the problem will be the best
way to fully understand the nature of the problem and what to match, i.e., what are the features to be used in
matching; what are the constraints we have to consider; how to match, i.e., the matching process for achieving a
consistent match; how to evaluate the match, i.e., define the similarity measure (p.3). The challenge in slow or lowrate DoS/DDoS attack is to map the proximity between attacking packets for identification, and then to initiate trace
back methods based on the identified packets.
To evaluate the similarity between two different objects x and y, a distance metric known as Euclidean Distance
(EU) is used. This metric can also be generalized into n-dimensions points, such that a={x1, x2, … xn} and b={y1, y2,
…, yn}. In this case, n-dimensions EU metric is defined as:
=
To apply this metric to a Web server or to a mobile device then the log files have to be isolated for analysis. Let L1
and L2 be the existing log file and the current log file, respectively. Let xi represent each protocol used in the
existing log and yi represent the protocol used in the current log, where i={1, 2, …, n} and n is the total number of
protocols where, L1 ={x1, x2, …, xn} and L2 ={y1, y2, …, yn}. For computational purposes the Euclidean distance can
be normalized into a distance based similarity as follow:
The normalized EU delivers a value in between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 means that the two objects are identical
and a value other than 1 means that the two objects are not identical. Consequently the analysis focuses upon the
discrimination between two known log files. The differential will indicate changes that can inform the alert of an
attack. For the DDoS attack various protocols can be engaged in an attack (see figure 1). In order to detect an attack,
the similarity between the existing and the current log files are ranked. In doing so, the Euclidean distance between
L1 and L2 is calculated by using the first equation and then the similarity can be ranked based on the second
equation. Table 1 provides a worked example of the detection metrics being applied to a sample set of mobile attack
data that was downloaded from the Internet to illustrate the use of the detection system. It is a simple case of
calculating the distance based similarity of various protocols that were used in the attack. The sample data was
taken from a live attack and then processed. Once the attack has been detected, the protocol that was engaged in the

Table 2. A simple case of distance based similarity ranking.
Protocols
L1
L2
EU(L1, L2)
S

HTTP
x1=1000
y1=21000
20000
0.00005

HTTPS
x2=800
y2=1000
200
0.004

ICMP
x3=600
y3=600
0
1

TCP
x4=2000
y4=3000
1000
0.001

UDP
x5=5000
y5=7000
2000
0.0005

SYN
x6=6000
y6=1000
5000
0.0002

IRC
x7=200
y7=500
300
0.03

attack needs to be identified. This data in Table 2 shows in the S row that only one ICMP sample was the same. The
variations in the other protocols indicates that an attack is occurring through them.

INVESTIGATING SLOW ATTACKS
Mobile forensics is defined as the science of recovering digital evidences from a mobile device under forensically
sound conditions using accepted methods (Mumba and Venter, 2014, p.4). Mobile forensics investigation process
consist of 15 phases that are divided into three main processes. The initialization process, the acquisition processes
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and the investigative processes. (Omeleze and Venter, 2013, p.5). The investigative processes consists of six
processes. The Potential digital evidence acquisition, digital evidence examination and analysis, digital evidence
interpretation, reporting, presentation and investigation closure (Mumba and Venter, 2014, p.4). The processes
employed in this study only concern the examination and analysis phase. The results will be used to determine a
slow attack first and then initiate trace back the potential location of the attacker (Curran, et al., 2010; Omeleze et
al., 2013). These processes were designed not only to eliminate the irrelevant data but assure the admissibility of the
evidence in the court of law (Jansen, et al., 2007). The mobile forensics analysis process as illustrated in figure 1
starts with the data acquired from the victim’s device. The data is used together with the reports from the similarity
distance detection metric they can be calculated as a continuous live process or from previous log data.
Report from
similarity detection
START

Image from mobile
device

Identify similarity
results from the
image data

Similarity in
the data

NO

YES

Storage

Analyse packet
headers according to
similarity results

NO
Extract source IP
addreses

Found
evidence?

Further analysis &
start reconstructing
the attack path
YES
END

Prepare report

Figure 1. Mobile Low-rate DDoS forensics investigation process
Figure 1 assumes the common forensic soundness criteria are applied to correlate practice management by
answering the questions: What meaning can be extracted from the evidence? What are the potential error factors?
What are the training requirements for forensic practitioners? The model was developed to systematise processes
while we investigated a number of slow attacks.

TRACEBACK
Traditional trace back methods are well-established for the Internet and broadband devices. The evidence presented
in the introduction to this paper suggests that the majority of mobile phones are not broadband but the broadband
phones produced most of the traffic. In addition all phones have some form of connectivity to the Internet.
Therefore it is our argument that we can evaluate the traditional trace back methods and select the ones that are most
appropriate for tracing back slow attacks. One reason that spoofing is often facilitated in these and other DoS or
DDoS attacks is that it allows evasion of filters and quotas based on sender IP address, making tracing attackers
harder (Devasundaram et al., 2006). Yu (2014b) reinforces that tracking back to the attack origin in DDoS attacks is
a difficult and non-trivial problem due to the following reasons. Firstly, it is easy to forge or modify IP address (e.g.
IP spoofing). Secondly, the stateless nature of IP routing, where routers normally know only the next hop for
forwarding a packet instead of the entire end to end path taken by each packet, makes IP traceback even harder.
Moreover, the Internet was originally designed for fast file sharing in a trusted environment and the network
security was less important than communications, as it was a secondary consideration. Routers do not verify the
source address of IP packets and the entire routing table is constructed on a trust basis. However, there are
methodologies they can trace back to the last router from single packets. These methods can also be applied to trace
back slow attacks, packet by packet (Goodrich, 2008).

7

A number of trace back methodologies can be rejected because they are impractical or too costly to implement.
With slow attacks we are dealing with single packets or periodic clustered dispersions which are drip fed into a
system to compromise devices. The metric can detect these time based malicious packets and once an alert sounded,
trace back methods can be employed. A slow Denial of Service (DoS) attack can be characterized as an attack with
the purpose of preventing legitimate users from using some specific network utilities such as a website, web service
or computer system (Hadiks et al., 2014). It is also a coordinated attack on the availability of the service of a given
target system or network. It can be launched indirectly through many compromised computing systems. The
websites or other mobile devices used to launch the attack are often called the ‘secondary victims’ (Izaddoost et al.,
2007). The use of secondary victims in a slow DDoS attack provides an attacker with the ability to launch a much
larger and more disruptive attack than a slow DoS attack while remaining anonymous since the secondary victims
actually complete the attack, and hence make it more difficult for the digital forensic investigator (DFI) to track
down the original attacker. In general, there are two types of standard attacks (Leavitt, 2005): direct and reflector
attacks. In a direct attack, an attacker sends attack packets directly towards the victims. Attack packets can be any of
the protocols in figure 1. (Kumar et al., 2011). In each attack on a mobile device a variety of networks are being
used. The first instance it may be a Wi-Fi connection, or a direct cellular signal, or any other wireless protocol.
Although it may be theoretically possible to trace back in IP address and practice there are too many mediating
factors, including spoofing, dynamic IP, and other obfuscations. However at the packet level the packets carry
information regarding the pathway they have taken. For example the ICMP protocol can hold information regarding
at least the last two or three services it transacted through routers. Hence, in particular for mobile devices connected
to a wireless router trace back progress can be made.
Table 3. Comparison of Traceback Methods
Traceback Method

Hop Count
Filtering

ICMP

Logging

Marking

Marking
&
Logging

TTL &
Marking

FDDA

ISP Involvement

None

Low

Moderate

Low

None

None

None

No. of Attack
Packets needed for
traceback

1

Very
Large

1

Very
Large

1

Very
Large

large

Processing Overhead

Very Low

Low

Low

Low

Very
Low

Low

High

Storage

Very Low

Low

Low

High

High

High

High

Ease of
Implementation

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Scalability

Highest

High

Fair

High

High

Highest

Highest

Bandwidth Overhead

None

Low

None

None

None

High

High

No. of functions
needed to implement

3

2

3

2

5

5

6

Ability to handle
major DDOS attack

Yes

Yes

Yes

Poor

Yes

Yes

Yes

Classification

IDS Based

Proactive

IDS Based

Proactive

IDS
Based

Proactive

IDS
Based

OSI Model Layer
and Protocols

IP, Network
Layer

ICMP,
Network
Layer

IP,
Network
Layer

IP,
Network
Layer

IP,
Network
Layer

IP,
Network
Layer

IP,
Network
Layer
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The intermediate routers (routers between the source and destination) will generate a special ICMP packet
according to the probability of 1 out of 20,000 once it receives an IP packet. The ICMP packet will be sent to either
the source or the destination host with equal probability. The router’s path information is stored in the ICMP packet
and is collected and analyzed at the destination host. With forward or back link information, two routers can be
identified in the path; while with two links of information, three routers can be identified. Because only partial path
information is contained in the ICMP packet, it will be extremely difficult to identify several attack paths under a
flooding DDoS attack but for slow attacks the method is much more effective (Kumar et al., 2010). To consistently
construct the full or partial path, the destination host has to match the original IP packet with its corresponding
ICMP packet, and this can be difficult. However, if the ICMP method is used in conjunction with the hop count
method then some of the obstacles to tracing back to the source of the malicious packets can be overcome. The
basic idea of hop count filtering method is to identify spoofed IP packets by using the source OS address and the
hop count value in the IP packet and the filter of the spoofed IP packet under DoS and DDoS attack. The rational is
that most of spoofed IP packets do not carry hop count values that are consistent with the IP address being spoofed
at victim’s device. Hence, an IP-to-hop-count (IP2HC) mapping table is built by the use of our metric during
operations to distinguish between malicious and normal traffic. The simulation results show that close to 90% of
spoofed traffic was identified (Paxson, 2001; Plohmann et al., 2011). Once an accurate IP2HC mapping table is
built, the inspection algorithm checks the source IP address and the final time-to-live (TTL) value in each packet.
The hop count method is not precisely an IP traceback method, since it cannot accurately pin point the attacking
origin. It can only give a list of possible routers associating with an attacking origin. If all of the routers on the list
form a circle, then the victim is the center and the hop count distance is the radius. Coupled with the ICMP analysis
these are the most effective ways to trace back a slow DoS/DDoS attack (Smoeren et al., 2004).

CONCLUSION
Detecting and tracing slow attacks on mobile phone user services is possible when combinations of methodologies
are employed. We have demonstrated using dummy attack data from the web (Table 2) that our metric will detect
and alert a slow denial of service attack from any of the protocols in Table 1. The review of trace back
methodologies shows that many are not useful for slow attack but a combination of ICMP and the hop count
methodologies can be effective by simply focusing on the packets. Disruption and other attacks will continue to
grow on mobile devices of any bandwidth. Consequently, further research is required into detection, protection, and
trace back methodologies in order to secure services.
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